The Implicit Learning of Mappings between Forms and Contextually-Derived Meanings by Leung, JHC & Williams, JN
Title The Implicit Learning of Mappings between Forms andContextually-Derived Meanings
Author(s) Leung, JHC; Williams, JN
Citation Studies in Second Language Acquisition, 2011, v. 33 n. 1, p. 33-55
Issued Date 2011
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/129043
Rights Studies in Second Language Acquisition. Copyright ©Cambridge University Press.
 Studies in Second Language Acquisition , 2011,  33 , 33– 55 .
doi:10.1017/S0272263110000525
© Cambridge University Press 2011 33
 THE IMPLICIT LEARNING OF 
MAPPINGS BETWEEN FORMS 
AND CONTEXTUALLY 
DERIVED MEANINGS 
 The study was funded by the Sir Edward Youde Memorial Fellowship awarded to the fi rst 
author for her doctoral research and was presented at The 28th Annual Conference of the 
Cognitive Science Society. We are grateful to four anonymous  SSLA reviewers for their 
constructive comments on an earlier version of the article. 
 * Address correspondence to: Janny Leung, School of English, The University of Hong 
Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong; e-mail:  jannyleung@hku.hk . 
 Janny H. C.  Leung 
 John N.  Williams 
 The University of Hong Kong 
 University of Cambridge 
 The traditional implicit learning literature has focused primarily on the 
abstraction of statistical regularities in form-form connections. More 
attention has been recently directed toward the implicit learning of 
form-meaning connections, which might be crucial in the acquisition 
of natural languages. The current article reports evidence for implicit 
learning of a mapping between a novel set of determiners and thematic 
roles, obtained using a newly developed reaction time methodology. 
The results conclude that contextually derived form-meaning con-
nections might be implicitly learned. 
 The phenomenon of implicit learning—that is, learning that proceeds 
without awareness of what is being learned and without intention to learn 
it—has aroused heated debate in cognitive psychology over the past few 
decades. In the context of SLA—contrary to Leow ( 2000 ), who reported 
that unawareness does not play an important role in second-language 
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(L2) development—Williams ( 2004 ,  2005 ) provided empirical evidence 
that L2 learning might proceed implicitly. Although there is now some 
support that language acquisition may draw on implicit learning pro-
cesses, little is known about the aspects of language that can be learned 
implicitly and the kind of constraints that act on the implicit learning of 
language. This study aims to extend Williams’s fi ndings. 
 Traditional studies of implicit learning, or incidental learning for 
those not concerned with the measurement of awareness, have focused 
primarily on the implicit abstraction of statistical probabilities in form-
form connections. It has been shown, for instance, that fi nite state 
grammars (Reber,  1967 ; Reber & Allen,  1978 ) can be learned implicitly 
and that transitional probabilities between syllables as a potential cue 
to lexical segmentation (Saffran, Newport, & Aslin,  1996 ) and phrase 
structure (Saffran,  2001 ) can be learned by mere exposure. However, 
caution should be exercised before generalizing this contention to SLA 
because language systems, at the core of which lies meaning, are far 
more sophisticated than simple form-form mappings. Implicit learning 
of language systems, particularly that of form-meaning connections, 
warrants independent investigation. 
 The issue of implicit learning of form-meaning connections amounts 
to the following: If a person hears a word at the same time that some 
concept is activated in his or her mind, can this person learn the asso-
ciation between them without any intention of doing so and without any 
awareness that the word and concept are connected? 
 The orthodox position seems to be that vocabulary learning—the 
mapping between content words and lexical meaning—requires explicit 
processing. Vocabulary learning is believed to depend not just on simple 
associative learning but also on joint attention (e.g., the sharing, fol-
lowing, and directing of attentional focus between communicative par-
ticipants) and theory of mind (i.e., the understanding of mental states, 
as suggested by Bloom,  2000 ,  2001 ). Additionally, Krashen and Terrel 
( 1983 ) linked vocabulary learning to comprehension. Their theory pro-
posed that comprehensibility is “dependent directly on the ability to 
recognize the meaning of key elements in the utterance” (p. 155). 
 Amnesics (i.e., people who suffer from memory loss), who show a 
normal ability in implicit memory tasks, tend to have great diffi culty 
in learning new vocabulary (Gabrieli, Cohen, & Corkin,  1988 ; Haist, 
Musen, & Squire,  1991 ; Squire,  1992 ). Based on the amnesic litera-
ture, N. C. Ellis ( 1994 ) concluded that attention (but not awareness) is 
necessary and suffi cient for learning novel word forms, whereas the 
acquisition of word meanings requires both attention and awareness. 
From a computational perspective, Gupta and Dell ( 1999 ) also argued 
that form-meaning mappings are too arbitrary in nature to be assimi-
lated using the kinds of implicit learning mechanisms that underlie 
skill learning. 
Implicit Learning of Form-Meaning Mappings 35
 However, these arguments have been developed almost exclusively 
in the context of learning words for objects. When it comes to learning 
associations between grammatical forms and meanings, the situation 
may be very different. Bloom ( 2000 ) acknowledged that meanings of 
grammatical words (e.g., the article  the and the preposition  of ) are ac-
quired through abstraction across memories of instances of use. In-
deed, there is no reason why the case of learning words for objects 
should be any different. As noted by Quine, the learner has no way of 
knowing which aspect of an object (e.g., a rabbit) is being referred to by 
a novel word (e.g., referred to as a  gavagai by Quine,  1960 ). Meanings of 
both lexical and grammatical morphemes may only emerge through ab-
straction over multiple instances in memory. A few recent clinical 
studies have shown that amnesics can in fact learn novel associations, 
like in sequence learning (Gabrieli, Keane, Zarella, & Poldrack,  1997 ) or 
in learning the vocabulary and grammar of a L2 (Hirst, Phelps, Johnson, & 
Volpe,  1988 ). Vargha-Khadem, Gadian, Watkins, Connelly, Van Paesschen, 
and Mishkin ( 1997 ) found normal vocabulary, reading development, 
and general knowledge in three adult amnesics who had great diffi culty 
recalling events. These results went against the claim that vocabulary 
learning is necessarily dependent on declarative memory for specifi c 
episodes of word use. Rather, meaning may be implicitly abstracted 
from experience. It is possible that attention and explicit processing are 
only required for storing the associations between linguistic forms and 
their situation of use at the moment they are encountered and that the 
abstraction of meaning over time takes place unconsciously. 
 The competition model (Bates & MacWhinney,  1989 ) provides a 
framework for thinking about the implicit acquisition of form-meaning 
connections. Learners track the probabilities with which input forms 
(e.g., preverbal positioning, verb agreement morphology, sentence ini-
tial positioning, nominative case-marking, etc.) are associated with spe-
cifi c meanings (e.g., agency). Such probability tracking is clearly 
implicitly processed. There is no awareness of these probabilities or of 
the process by which they are constantly updated through usage. Basic 
principles of associative learning, such as overshadowing and blocking, 
can be applied to learning these form-function mappings and can be 
used to explain fi rst-language (L1) and L2 learning phenomena such as 
morpheme acquisition orders, fossilization, transfer, and interference 
(N. C. Ellis,  2006 ). Implicit learning mechanisms might play an impor-
tant role in tracking the contingencies between forms and meanings. 
 Laboratory-type SLA research in implicit learning is mostly restricted 
to studies that contrasted the learning effect obtained between an ex-
plicit condition (rule-search or explicit instruction) and an implicit con-
dition (memorization only; DeKeyser,  1995 ; Robinson,  1996 ,  1997 ) or to 
studies between participants with a differential level of awareness of the 
target structure (Alanen,  1995 ; Leow,  2000 ; Rosa & Leow,  2004 ; Rosa & 
Janny H. C. Leung and John N. Williams36
O’Neill,  1999 ), without directly testing the notion of whether implicit 
learning of the target structure is possible. Although these studies typi-
cally found that participants who performed a more explicit task or had 
a higher degree of awareness showed better performance on an experi-
mental task, it may well be that these participants possessed both im-
plicit and explicit knowledge of the target structure, which would fully 
explain why their performance was better than participants with im-
plicit knowledge only. Moreover, few attempts were made in these 
studies to provide an optimal condition for implicit learning. Attention 
was rarely drawn to the relevant form and meaning in the implicit 
training tasks used. Additionally, training and testing tasks were often 
distinct, despite the understanding that implicit knowledge is relatively 
infl exible and context dependent. 
 Some evidence of implicit learning of grammatical form-meaning con-
nections was found in Williams ( 2004 ,  2005 ). For example, in Experi-
ment 1 of Williams ( 2005 ), participants fi rst learned four determinerlike 
words that functioned similarly to the English defi nite article, except 
that they also encoded the distance between the speaker and the object 
( gi and  ro for near objects and  ul and  ne for far objects). What partici-
pants were not told was that the use of these determiners also depended 
on the animacy of the accompanying noun ( gi and  ul for animate objects 
and  ro and  ne for inanimates). Participants were then exposed to 
training sentences that combined English lexis with the novel deter-
miners, as in  The researchers studied ul bees from a safe distance . Partic-
ipants had to repeat the sentences, indicate whether the novel word 
meant  near or  far by pressing the appropriate response button, and 
form a mental image of the situation portrayed by the sentence in antic-
ipation of a memory test on sentence content. Afterward, participants 
performed a surprise generalization test in which novel contexts were 
used and they had to choose between two possible determiners, one of 
which violated the animacy rule—for example,  The art collector went to 
Greece to collect ul/ne vases . For the critical (generalization) items, 
neither determiner had occurred with that noun during training. 
Thirty-three out of 44 participants claimed that they were not aware of 
the relevance of animacy to article usage during training or test phases, 
yet these unaware participants were slightly above chance in selecting 
the correct article for generalization items in the test phase. This study 
provided evidence of implicit learning of grammatical form-meaning 
connections, without attention being explicitly directed to the relevant 
aspects of meaning. 
 An important issue in all implicit learning research is whether the 
tests of awareness are sensitive enough. In an extension of the Williams 
( 2005 ) study, Hama and Leow (2010) adopted the same system and 
training task but asked participants to think aloud during the training 
and test phases. The training phase protocols revealed no instances of 
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noticing the animacy correlation, which confi rmed that this training 
procedure was effective in defl ecting participants’ attention from the 
hidden regularity. The testing phase protocols revealed that 8 out of 
34 participants were aware of the relevance of animacy, at either the 
level of noticing or understanding. Two of these 8 failed to report 
animacy in a postexperiment questionnaire, which was similar to that 
used by Williams. In contrast, there was also one case of a participant 
who mentioned animacy in the questionnaire but not in the think-
aloud protocol. Thus, there does not appear to be a large difference 
in sensitivity between postexperiment debriefi ngs and concurrent 
think-aloud. 
 In contrast to the Williams ( 2005 ) study, Hama and Leow (2010) found 
that after removing all 9 of the aware participants, the remainder 
showed no tendency to choose the article with the correct animacy 
value in the test phase. However, there are a number of procedural dif-
ferences between the two studies that might account for this null result, 
the most notable of which is that Hama and Leow used a four-choice—
rather than a two-choice—test task. Participants had to focus on the 
learned distance dimension during the decision process, forcing atten-
tion to the sentence context as a factor controlling article selection, 
potentially defl ecting attention from the noun. It should also be noted 
that Hama and Leow’s participants even performed poorly on trained 
items; that is, they could not discriminate animacy-appropriate and 
animacy-inappropriate items when the correct choice had actually been 
heard six times in training. In contrast, in Williams, performance on 
trained items exceeded that of new items. Hama and Leow’s result 
might therefore refl ect a global lack of attention to the noun as a poten-
tial controlling factor in the test task, or else a failure to reliably encode 
article-noun combinations during the training phase. None of Hama and 
Leow’s participants knew languages that encode grammatical gender. 
Given that in Williams ( 2004 ,  2005 ) there was evidence that learning ef-
fects were barely above chance for participants who knew no gender 
languages, it hardly seems surprising that Hama and Leow obtained no 
learning effect. 1 
 In this experiment, the generality of implicit learning of form-meaning 
connections is explored, and an alternative methodology for examining 
implicit learning in this domain is also developed. With regard to gener-
ality, the experiment sought to establish whether implicit learning 
could be obtained for a different kind of form-meaning connection. The 
Williams ( 2004 ,  2005 ) studies involved animacy, which, as a semantic 
feature of nouns, is directly retrievable from the lexicon. DeKeyser’s 
( 1995 ) grammar involved number and thematic role, which are contex-
tually derived features. Given that DeKeyser failed to fi nd implicit 
learning effects, it could be that implicit learning is limited to cases in 
which the relevant features can be directly retrieved from the lexicon. 
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For example, to learn that  gi is associated with animate objects but  ro 
with inanimates, it would be suffi cient to store exemplars of determiner-
noun combinations in memory, and the relevant generalization would 
emerge from abstraction over the preexisting, context-independent 
lexical representations of the nouns involved. In contrast, to learn that 
the suffi x  –on marks plurality, it is necessary to abstract over represen-
tations of instances of use of the word that contains contextually 
derived information. If this information is not reliably encoded in the 
input, then inducing the relevant generalization will be more diffi cult. 
Additionally, discovering the meaning features that map onto novel 
forms would presumably be easier when the search space is limited to 
lexical features as opposed to the much wider range of potentially relevant 
contextually derived features. To this end, this experiment investi-
gated whether implicit learning could be obtained in a situation in 
which determiners were correlated with the thematic role of the ac-
companying noun, which is information that needs to be derived from 
the context rather than the lexicon. 
 The second aim of the study was to develop a novel methodology for 
examining implicit learning of form-meaning connections that did not 
involve forced-choice decisions. This was inspired by the serial reaction 
time methodology traditionally used to study implicit learning as well 
as by work done in vision research, especially the contextual cueing 
paradigm (Chun,  2000 ; Jiang & Chun, 2003) and the derived attention 
paradigm of Lambert and colleagues (Lambert  2002 ; Lambert & Sumich, 
 1996 ). According to Chun ( 2000 ), people develop sensitivity to statis-
tical regularities in the stimulus environment, which constrains what to 
expect and where to look. In a visual search task, participants search 
for a rotated  T among a number of distracting rotated  L s. Unbeknownst 
to the participants, displays are repeated such that certain spatial con-
fi gurations of distracters tend to appear with certain target positions. 
Response times are signifi cantly shorter on these repeated trials than 
on control trials, for which the distracter positions are determined ran-
domly. This is called the contextual cueing effect. The fact that partici-
pants cannot distinguish repeated arrays from random ones in a 
subsequent forced-choice recognition task suggests that the learning 
effect is implicit. Thus, an attended stimulus can pick up correlations 
with so-called ambient stimuli, which can guide attention to the target, 
even if those stimuli themselves did not receive focal attention. 
Lambert ( 2002 ), again using speed of detection of the onset of the target 
stimulus as a measurement of learning, found that learning of the pre-
dictive relationship between cues (letters  w and  s ) and targets (the spa-
tial location of objects) orients participants’ attention and called this a 
derived attention effect. Learning proceeded without awareness; when 
presented with two statements, one of which described the correct 
cue-target relationship and the other the incorrect use, participants 
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exhibited chance performance at picking the correct statement. Lambert 
and Sumich ( 1996 ) showed that spatial attention can also be directed 
by abstract attributes like the semantic category (e.g., animacy, as in 
 dog vs.  hat ) of the cue words, which served as a cue to the target loca-
tions of objects. Consistent with these fi ndings, Goujon, Didierjean, and 
Marmèche ( 2007 ) reported that the semantic category of the contextual 
stimuli (whether digits were odd or even) can act as a cue to target 
location. Participants implicitly learned the relationship between the 
cue and the target without being able to report any awareness of the 
predictiveness of the contexts, or to distinguish trials that respected or 
violated these predictions. 
 Language processing research has shown that people also develop 
sensitivity to the relationship between visual and linguistic information. 
In the visual world paradigm, Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, 
and Sedivy ( 1995 ) used eye-movement tracking to reveal that visual con-
text affected the resolution of temporary syntactic ambiguity in audio 
instructions. They described this as evidence for the “rapid and nearly 
seamless integration of visual and linguistic information” (p. 1633) and 
suggested that people try to establish reference during the earliest 
moments of syntactic processing. Assuming a close link between 
language forms and attentional processes, changes in attentional 
processes (i.e., referent identifi cation) are used over time as indicators 
of learning. 
 There are three signifi cant improvements to this new methodology, 
which makes the current experiment potentially more sensitive to im-
plicit learning effects than earlier studies like Williams ( 2004 ,  2005 ) and 
Hama and Leow (2010). First, a concurrent measure of learning, as 
opposed to a posttraining grammaticality judgment test, was used. 
From the participants’ point of view, there was no division between 
training and test phases but rather just one task performed across one 
continuous stream of trials. This is desirable according to the transfer-
appropriate processing framework, which has postulated that perfor-
mance on an implicit memory task receives facilitation in proportion to 
the degree of overlap between study and test processing (Roediger, 
 1990 ). In a similar manner, implicit learning in serial reaction time tasks 
has been shown to be infl exible and context-specifi c (Jiménez, Vaquero, 
& Lupianez,  2006 ), and therefore, given the limited time for learning in a 
laboratory setting, task change is best avoided. In SLA, it has also been 
acknowledged that transfer of knowledge acquired in receptive modal-
ities to the use of knowledge in productive modalities seems weak 
(Hulstijn,  2002 ). Second, the training and testing task used involved 
comprehension rather than production. Because knowledge has to 
reach a higher threshold to be expressed in production, the lesser pro-
cessing demand in our task makes it more sensitive to implicit knowl-
edge. Finally, a reaction time task that introduced time pressure was 
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used. It was assumed that this encouraged the use of implicit rather 
than explicit knowledge. Destrebecqz and Cleeremans ( 2001 ) found the 
strongest evidence for implicit learning in a serial reaction time task 
when there was no delay between a response and the next stimulus. In 
a SLA study, R. Ellis ( 2005 ) found that timed and untimed grammati-
cality judgment test performance depended on the learners’ implicit 
and explicit knowledge, respectively. R. Ellis ( 2005 ) reasoned that this 
was because time pressure encouraged the use of feel rather than rule 
and limited the opportunity to access metalinguistic knowledge. There-
fore, it is assumed that the time pressure induced by the reaction time 
test reduces the likelihood that participants will become aware of the 
target regularity (the mapping between articles and thematic roles) and 
encourages reliance on implicit knowledge. 
 THE EXPERIMENT 
 Materials 
 The current experiment investigates the implicit learning of a mapping 
between thematic roles and a set of novel determiners. Participants 
were introduced to four artifi cial articles:  gi ,  ro ,  ul , and  ne , where  gi and 
 ro were used before personal names referring to adults and  ul and  ne 
were used before personal names referring to children. What partici-
pants had not been told was that article use also depended on the the-
matic role of the accompanying noun phrase;  gi and  ul were used with 
agents and  ro and  ne were used with patients. The terms  agent and  pa-
tient here referred to Dowty’s ( 1991 ) notions of proto-agent and proto-
patient, which have a broader defi nition than the senses they bear in 
generative grammar. For instance, the category agent would include 
technical concepts such as agents, actors, causers, and so forth. The 
miniature article system is presented in  Table 1 . 
 Each experimental trial consisted of a distinct picture (like that in 
 Figure 1 ) with an accompanying audio description, such as  Kiss ul Mary 
a boy on the face . The participants’ primary task was to indicate as 
quickly as possible whether the named individual ( Mary in this case; 
 Table 1.  Miniature article system used 
 Person  Agent  Patient 
 Adult  Gi  Ro 
 Children  Ul  Ne 
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only one person was named for each picture) appeared on the left- or 
right-hand side of the picture. To avoid some articles becoming more 
salient than others due to the position they appeared in, fl exible sen-
tence orders were used in the picture descriptions. Sentences included 
a verb (V), noun phrase 1 (NP1), noun phrase 2 (NP2), and preposi-
tional phrase (PP), following the pattern V + NP1 + NP2 + PP. Whereas 
either NP1 or NP2 could be an agent or patient, NP1 was always a proper 
name and NP2 was always a common noun; V was always in its infi nitive 
form. Therefore, the two possible sentence constructions to describe 
 Figure 2 are given in (1) and (2):
  
 (1)  Kiss ul Mary  a boy  on the face . 
  V  NP1(Agent)  NP2 (Patient)  PP 
 (2)  Kiss  ne David  a girl  on the face . 
  V  NP1(Patient) NP2 (Agent)  PP 
  
 Verb-subject-object (VSO) and verb-object-subject (VOS) structures 
exist in natural languages. For example, VSO is the dominant word or-
der in Samoan, but VOS is also possible and common (Robinson,  2002 ). 
 Three common names for each gender were used with each possible 
article with equal frequency to avoid any input bias in article-name 
associations. The frequency of agents and patients appearing as NP1 
was balanced. 
  
 Figure 1.  A sample picture. 
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 Because word order does not reveal the thematic roles of nouns, the 
determiners are the only surface forms that mark this meaning. If partic-
ipants learned the correlation between articles and thematic roles, then 
their attention could, in principle, be directed to the appropriate indi-
vidual in the picture even before hearing the proper name, thereby fa-
cilitating their responses (e.g., on hearing  Kiss ul . . . they would know 
that the named individual was the agent of the action and therefore 
choose the girl on the right of the picture). It should also be the case 
that if the mapping between articles and thematic roles is then reversed 
(in what will be referred to as the violation block), response times 
should be slowed and errors should increase. If the mapping between 
articles and thematic roles is learned implicitly, then these effects 
should be obtained even if the participants have no awareness that 
there is an association between articles and thematic roles or that it 
was reversed in the violation block. 
 One hundred twenty pictures were adopted so that an agent and a 
patient of the depicted action were clearly identifi able. Eighty-eight of 
these were used for the training phase and 32 were used for the testing 
phase. The training phase items were devised so that participants 
could use a variety of cues to determine their response apart from the 
article-thematic role mappings (which could determine the correct re-
sponse in all cases). Fifteen of the pictures involved interactions be-
tween an adult and child. Given that the participants were told that two 
of the articles were used with children and two with adults, it would be 
possible, in principle, for responses to these items to be based solely 
on the form of the article. These items were important in orienting par-
ticipants’ attention to the articles. For 65 training items, the depicted 
individuals were both adults or children but different in gender. In 
such cases, participants would be likely to respond on hearing the 
proper name. For eight items, both individuals depicted were of the 
same age and gender. In such cases, participants would presumably 
rely on cues later in the sentence to make their response (assuming no 
knowledge of the target system). For example, when there were two 
men in the picture and the sentence was  Arrest ro David a police offi cer , 
participants were able to distinguish David based on the fact that the 
man in the police uniform was the unnamed individual. In this case, 
participants may have reacted after hearing further cues that did not 
come until after the proper name. The variety of cue types was 
designed to motivate and habituate the participants to respond at 
different points of hearing the audio presentation, using as little 
information as possible. 
 The critical data came from the last 32 trials of the experiment, 
which were divided into control and violation blocks. There was no 
division between these trials and the training from the participant’s 
point of view. All of the pictures used in these blocks depicted either 
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two adults or two children. For this reason, the articles could have 
predictive value only if participants knew the correct mapping from 
articles to thematic roles. In the control block, the sentences re-
spected the same system used in training, whereas in the violation 
block, the mapping between articles and thematic roles was reversed 
so that  gi and  ul were used with patients and  ro and  ne were used 
with agents. Items were rotated between the control and violation 
blocks over two groups of randomly assigned participants so as to 
control for differences in item diffi culty. For example, one group of 
participants received the correct  Examine gi Mary a patient in a den-
tal clinic in the control block, whereas the second group received 
that item in the violation block in the incorrect form  Examine ro Mary 
a patient in a dental clinic . 
 The item and cue types are summarized in  Table 2 . Note that in all 
cases, if participants had learned the article-thematic role mapping, 
they would be able to base their decisions solely on the articles. Even if 
knowledge of this mapping remained implicit, it is possible that it would 
facilitate responses that the participant believed to be based on the 
other available cues. 
 All aural stimuli were recorded by the second author, a native speaker 
of British English. The interval between the onset of the article and on-
set of the name was exactly 1 s, and the duration of the article was 0.5 s. 
This provided a time window in which the article could be used to 
orient attention even before the name was presented. The time to indi-
cate whether the named individual was on the right or the left of the 
picture was measured from the onset of the article. 
 All training trials were randomized individually for each participant, 
as were all trials within the control and the violation blocks. 
 Table 2.  Distribution of cue types in the training and testing phase 
 Cue types  Cued by 
 Percentage 
of items 
 Number 
of items 
 Training 
  Different gender  The proper name  73.9%  65 
  Different age  The determiner  17%  15 
  Other cues  Words that appear after 
  the proper name 
 9.1%  8 
  Total   100%  88 
 Testing (control and violation) 
  Different gender  The proper name  100%  32 
  Total   100%  32 
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 Procedure 
 The participants fi lled out a language background questionnaire to en-
sure that they had no advanced knowledge of languages with highly 
developed case systems such as German or Latin. They then received 
vocabulary pretraining for the four articles. They were told that the or-
der of words in the sentences presented to them would not be as in 
English. Examples were given so that participants became familiar with 
the articles and the sentence structure. They were given as much time 
as they needed for this pretraining. Nine sample pictures were provided 
in the instructions to help familiarize the participants with the adult-
child distinction in the determiners. 
 All procedures of the experiment were computerized and standardized. 
The experimenter was available to clarify any questions when needed. 
Superlab for Windows Pro 2.0 was used to provide all of the pretraining, 
instructions, stimulus presentation, and data collection (i.e., reaction 
time measurement). All verbal responses were recorded on an audiotape. 
A two-button serial mouse was used as the input device. Participants 
were told to rest their left and right index fi ngers on the buttons. 
 The experiment was disguised as a reaction time test, and the partic-
ipants had to click to proceed from one task to the next. For each pic-
ture, the participants had to perform three tasks. 
 Picture Description .  The participants were asked to describe the pic-
ture in their own words. This task was used to ensure that participants 
paid attention to the action and the direction of action as shown on the 
picture. 
 Reaction Time Test .  The participants had to click left or right on the 
mouse as quickly as possible as they listened to an audio picture descrip-
tion, as soon as they could decide on which side of the picture the named 
individual appeared. Responses had to be made before the end of the 
auditory sentence (responses beyond this limit were not recorded). If 
participants gave a wrong answer, the page would reload and they would 
have to start the audio presentation and reaction time test again. Reaction 
times for second and further attempts were excluded from the data 
analysis. This task was the crucial measurement of the experiment. 
 Sentence Reformulation .  This task was designed so that the participants 
put the sentence they heard into correct English order, retaining the article 
used (to stimulate concurrent active processing of the action portrayed 
and the article used). The participants were not constrained in their choice 
of syntactic structure in their reformulations. For example, the sentence 
 Examine gi Mary a patient in a dental clinic could be reformulated as 
 Gi Mary examined a patient in a dental clinic or  A patient was examined by 
gi Mary in a dental clinic . The task forced the participants to concurrently 
process the form (articles) and the related meaning (thematic roles). 
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 A recall test was inserted between every two pictures so that partici-
pants would repeat the sentences they had reformulated in correct English 
order for the last two pictures. During this recall test, the participants were 
able to look at the pictures again, with a prompt that read “???” to remind 
them of the reformulation task. Participants were told that exact wording 
was not needed but that it was important to use the exact articles used. 
Feedback was not provided for this task, but participants knew that their 
answers had been recorded. The recall test ascertained that participants 
listened to the whole sentence in the audio presentation to make sure that 
they interpreted the action in the picture (and thus the roles of the individ-
uals involved) the way it was intended. Participants were also encouraged 
to rely on the pictures as cues to the recall task. By doing so, it was hoped 
that the form and meaning of the articles would be activated concurrently 
when the participants tried to memorize and recall the sentences. 
 Participants were reminded before the start of the experiment that 
they might be able to react more quickly if they paid attention to the arti-
cles. This was the case even assuming no knowledge of the mapping be-
tween articles and thematic roles because they had learned that  gi and  ro 
were only used with adults and  ul and  ne were only used with children. 
 An interview was conducted at the end of the experiment. Participants 
were asked if they had any feelings about when  gi versus  ro and  ul versus 
 ne were used. They then looked through some of the training items again 
(no more than 10 items) and were asked to report any idea that came to 
mind. They were encouraged to make as many guesses as possible. It was 
assumed by the authors that instruction to guess makes the procedure 
sensitive even to conscious knowledge in which the participants have 
little confi dence. There was therefore not just reliance on responses to 
open-ended questions whose sensitivity to conscious knowledge has 
been questioned (Shanks & St. John,  1994 ) but also on the guesses that 
are produced when prompted by further training trials. Participants were 
classifi ed as being aware or unaware on the basis of their reported knowl-
edge of the target form-meaning mapping. 
 The whole experiment took approximately 1 hr to complete. A 3-min 
break was inserted in the middle of the experiment. 
 Participants 
 Twenty-fi ve native English-speaking undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents at the University of Cambridge participated in this study. Eleven 
of them studied Arts subjects, fi ve studied Social Sciences, and nine 
studied Science or Engineering. No participant had advanced knowledge 
of any languages with highly developed case systems, such as German 
or Latin. Foreign languages known to the participants were French ( n = 14), 
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Spanish ( n = 10), Latin ( n = 2 intermediate), Bengali ( n = 1), Chinese 
( n = 1), German ( n = 1 intermediate), Hindi ( n = 1), Irish ( n = 1), Italian 
( n = 1), Persian ( n = 1), and Russian ( n = 1 intermediate). Participants were 
semirandomly assigned to the two presentation lists formed by rotating 
items around the control and violation blocks such that, ultimately, 
there were equal numbers of unaware participants on each list. 
 RESULTS 
 Postexperiment Report 
 Twenty out of 25 participants (80%) remained unaware of the system at 
the end of the experiment. Many unaware participants said it did not 
come to their mind at all that the two articles used for adults and chil-
dren were used in different conditions and were surprised when asked 
to comment on it. Five thought during the experiment that there might 
be a differentiation on the basis of gender, but after some trials, they 
realized that this was not the case. A further 6 participants mentioned 
gender when invited to make guesses during the debriefi ng. 2 
 The remaining 5 participants who were able to link the use of articles 
with concepts such as  someone doing something to the other person or 
 one person takes an active role and the other is more passive were all 
counted as aware, even if these were not the fi rst guesses they made. 
One of the aware participants reported only becoming aware of the pos-
sible relevance of thematic role after the experiment. The remaining 4 
said that they had become aware during the experiment, but 2 of them 
said that that they had not had a chance to verify it. All of these partic-
ipants were classifi ed as aware to make sure that participants who had 
an awareness of the implicit system but had low confi dence in the 
explicit knowledge were not included in the unaware data, which is the 
focus of the analysis. Among the 3 participants with some knowledge of 
German, Russian, or Latin, 2 were aware participants (1 with interme-
diate knowledge of Latin and Russian and 1 with intermediate German). 
The other participant who had intermediate Latin was unaware. 
 Unaware Participants 
 Outlying response times were identifi ed by setting cutoff limits at ±2.5 
standard deviations from each participant’s mean in the control and 
violation blocks, respectively. Outlying values were replaced with the 
appropriate cutoff value.  Figure 2 shows the average reaction time for 
correct selection of the position of the named individual against trial 
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blocks in different gender items for both the aware and the unaware 
participants. 
 Each block comprises 16 trials (apart from the fi rst 8, which were for 
task familiarization). The control block is block 6, and the violation 
block is block 7. With respect to the unaware participants, there is 
clearly a general trend for reaction times to decrease throughout the 
experiment, especially over the fi rst four blocks. However, there was a 
sudden increase in reaction times at the violation block. The mean 
reaction time in the control block was 1694 ms,  SE = 40 ms, and in the 
violation block, it was 1785 ms,  SE = 43 ms. A repeated-measures ANOVA 
showed that the reaction times for these blocks were signifi cantly dif-
ferent,  F (1, 19) = 4.64,  p < .05, partial  η 2 = .196. 3 As a more fi ne-grained 
measure of the violation effect, the reaction times in the last eight 
items in the control block were compared with the fi rst eight items in 
the violation block. The reaction times were 1673 ms,  SE = 49 ms, and 
1796 ms,  SE = 51 ms, respectively, and they were also signifi cantly dif-
ferent,  F (1, 19) = 4.97,  p < .05, partial  η 2 = .207. However, it is important 
to mention that, for this comparison, the items were not matched be-
cause of the randomized presentation order within the entire control/
violation block. Moreover, there were a few attempts among the un-
aware participants to respond in under 1 s (i.e., before they heard the 
proper names), providing further evidence that they directed their 
  
 Figure 2.  Reaction times across blocks for aware and unaware 
participants. 
Janny H. C. Leung and John N. Williams48
attention to the appropriate individual using the thematic role infor-
mation in the articles. 
 There was no signifi cant increase in errors in the violation block, the 
percentage of errors being 3.1% in the control block and 3.4% in the vi-
olation block,  F (1, 19) = 0.05,  p = .75. There was not a signifi cant differ-
ence in the proportion of outliers either, which were 3.4% and 3.1% in 
the control and violation blocks, respectively,  F (1, 19) = 0.11,  p = .62. 
The proportion of failures to respond before the end of the sentence 
increased from 1.6% in the control block to 3.4% in the violation block, 
but this difference was not signifi cant,  F (1, 19) = 3.35,  p = .08,  η 2 = .15. 
 Error rate in the repetition (94.6% correct) and recall (86.3% correct) 
tasks remained rather stable throughout the experiment. 
 Aware Participants 
 Given that there were only fi ve aware participants, any analysis of their 
performance must be extremely tentative. However, the reaction times 
for the aware group did appear to show a rather different pattern over 
the course of the experiment compared to the unaware group. Although 
there was a rapid decrease in reaction times at the beginning of the ex-
periment, the average reaction time fl attened out before falling again 
after block 4. There was no signifi cant difference between the control 
and violation blocks; the mean reaction times were 1592 ms,  SE = 172 ms, 
and 1497 ms,  SE = 113 ms, respectively,  F (1, 4) = 1.71,  p = .26. The propor-
tion of errors and outliers did not differ between the control and viola-
tion blocks, which were 11.2% and 10%, respectively, for errors, and 
2.5% and 3.8%, respectively, for outliers. There were rather more fail-
ures to respond before the end of the sentence in the violation block, 
18.8%, than the control block, 5%, but this difference was not signifi -
cant,  F (1, 4) = 3.14,  p > .1. It should be noted that the overall error rate 
was higher for the aware than the unaware participants, which were 
10.6% and 3.3%, respectively,  F (1, 23) = 8.74,  p < .01, partial  η 2 = .275. 
 DISCUSSION 
 Twenty out of the 25 participants in the experiment claimed to have no 
awareness of the mapping between the articles and thematic roles. 
However, when this mapping was reversed in the fi nal block of the ex-
periment, their reaction times increased signifi cantly compared to the 
preceding control block. It is therefore concluded that they had implic-
itly learned that certain articles were associated with certain thematic 
roles, which supports the hypothesis that form-meaning connections 
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can be learned implicitly. In previous research, such effects have only 
been obtained for animacy, a lexical property of nouns (Lambert & 
Sumich,  1996 ; Williams,  2004 ,  2005 ). The results of the current study 
suggest that contextually derived form-meaning connections might 
also be implicitly learned. 
 However, what might be the actual cause of the slowdown in the viola-
tion block? One explanation follows the logic of the contextual paradigm 
(Jiang & Chun,  2003 ) that inspired the present methodology. In those ex-
periments, participants were able to make use of cues to locate the target 
more quickly, and their reaction times were affected when this critical 
association was interrupted. This occurred even though participants 
appeared to be unaware that the cues were predictive of target location. 
In the present case it is possible to argue that, for example, on hearing the 
article  gi , participants would direct their attention to the agent of the ac-
tion (without knowing why) and expect the name of the corresponding 
individual. In the violation block their anticipation would be wrong (in 
this example they would hear the name of the patient instead), which 
would cause slower responses or a trend toward more response failures. 
There are two problems with this interpretation, however. First, there is 
no direct evidence that participants do actually direct their attention to 
the individual cued by the article. Perhaps with the use of eye-movement 
tracking it would be revealed whether a participant’s gaze is misdirected 
on violation trials. We are currently conducting experiments to explore 
this possibility. Second, there was no increase in errors in the violation 
block, yet an attentional explanation would appear to predict that there 
should have been. This might suggest that the violation effect is in fact 
caused by what is essentially an agreement violation. The named indi-
vidual is recognized as being either the agent or the patient of the action, 
and this information confl icts with the thematic role that is implicitly 
cued by the article. Such a mismatch would not necessarily provoke a 
response error because the confl ict is irrelevant to the decision as to 
whether the named individual is on the left or right of the screen. It is 
important to stress, however, that whether the violation effect is caused 
by misdirected attention or an agreement violation does not affect in any 
way the central claim that the effect occurs because participants have 
learned the mapping between articles and thematic roles. 
 Although the small number of aware participants ( n = 5) makes it im-
possible to make strong claims about their behavior, there is some evi-
dence that they showed a rather different pattern of results from the 
unaware group. Although their reaction times showed a sharp decrease 
early in training, presumably refl ecting increasing fl uency at performing 
the task, they later rose before gradually decreasing again. It is likely 
that these participants began forming and testing hypotheses and 
this caused a delay in their responses. The fi guring-out process took 
place at different stages for each individual, leading to irregularity in the 
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overall pattern. It is surprising, however, that there was no signifi cant 
difference in reaction times between the control and the violation blocks. 
It should be noted that due to the awareness criterion used, the aware 
participants had different degrees of awareness, which contributed to the 
variability of the data. The higher rate of errors and response failures in 
the aware group compared to the unaware group might have refl ected 
hypothesis formation and testing among the semiaware participants. 
Because of the small sample size of the aware group, there is no attempt to 
make any claims regarding their behavior here. It might be useful to con-
sider the results of Lambert ( 2002 ), who also reported a lack of a learning 
effect in semiaware participants, which he interpreted as attributable to 
the formation and testing of incorrect hypotheses concerning the cue-
target relation, leading to inappropriate orienting toward an invalid loca-
tion. Likewise, Frensch et al. ( 2002 ) reported an increase in reaction time 
variance before an observed learning effect was evident. Schmidt ( 2001 ) 
also noted that unconsciously perceived stimuli lead to automatic 
reactions, but consciously perceived stimuli allow participants to modify 
their reactions. Further research is needed to ascertain the precise behav-
ioral pattern of participants with a varying degree of explicit knowledge. 
 The comparison of the aware and unaware groups is at least sugges-
tive of differences in performance, and this provides encouraging con-
verging evidence for the classifi cation of unaware and aware participants 
based on verbal report. There is also evidence of a correspondence 
between verbal report and reaction time task performance in a related 
study (Leung & Williams,  2010 ) that, using a similar methodology, exam-
ined implicit learning of a mapping between novel articles and animacy 
(as in Williams,  2005 ). In this task, participants were presented with two 
pictures—for example, an armchair on the left and a goldfi sh on the 
right—and heard a single noun phrase,  gi goldfi sh . Their task was to in-
dicate whether the phrase referred to an animate or inanimate object 
by pressing one of two response keys. They were told that  gi and  ul are 
used with near objects and  ro and  ne were used with far objects 
(distance was represented by screen size and position of the object). 
What they were not told was that  gi and  ro were used with animate 
objects and  ul and  ne were used with inanimates. Learning of the ani-
macy correlation was evaluated by comparing control and violation 
blocks at the end of the experiment. Out of 33 participants, a total of 20 
appeared not to have been aware of the correlation between animacy 
and article use as assessed by the same debriefi ng procedure used 
here. Yet these participants showed a signifi cant slowdown in response 
times in the violation block, as in this study, which provides further 
evidence of learning a form-meaning mapping without awareness (al-
though one that is lexically, rather than contextually, derived). Among 
the 13 aware participants, there were interesting correspondences be-
tween verbal report and reaction time performance. Ten participants 
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claimed to have become aware of the system before the control block. 
Not surprisingly, they showed a large—and signifi cant—violation ef-
fect. In fact, their mean response time in the control block was actually 
less than 1 s, meaning that they were able to base their decisions on the 
article before hearing the noun (all control and violation block trials 
used pictures of the same distance, such that fast responses must be 
based on animacy information). This shows evidence of strategic use of 
conscious knowledge, something that was not possible in the present 
experiment because the instruction was to respond according to the 
named individual. It is necessary to stress that not a single response time 
of under 1 s was found in the control block data of the unaware group. 
There was no evidence of participants not reporting awareness of ani-
macy, but using it strategically in the reaction time task. Additionally, the 
verbal report of the remaining three aware participants suggested that 
they only became aware of the animacy correlation toward the end of the 
experiment. They showed no response times of less than 1 s and no slow-
down in the violation block—in fact, they were slightly faster than in the 
control block, as here, which suggests that they had either learned the 
violation block mapping or were still in the process of working it out. 
There was thus an encouraging correspondence between the verbal 
reports and actual reaction time task behavior. This confi rmed that the 
procedure for assessing awareness is suffi ciently sensitive. 
 The fi ndings from these studies seem to run counter to the idea that 
the acquisition of meaning depends on explicit processes and more 
generally to the pervasive idea that awareness is necessary for learning. 
Within psychology, it has been argued that not even the most basic 
form of learning—classical conditioning—can be obtained without 
awareness of the association between the conditioned and uncondi-
tioned stimuli—for example, the tone and puff of air in an eye-blink con-
ditioning procedure (Lovibond & Shanks,  2002 , but see Manns, Clark, & 
Squire,  2002 , for counter evidence). Within SLA research, the necessary 
connection between awareness and learning has long been noted 
(Schmidt,  1990 ), and empirical investigations of L2 learning have found 
no evidence of learning without awareness (e.g., Leow,  2000 ). However, 
there is not necessarily a contradiction between these claims and the 
present fi ndings. This is because it was assumed that in this study, the 
participants were fully aware of (i.e., they noticed) the critical phrase 
(e.g.,  ul Mary ) and its association to the entity (e.g., a girl) within the 
event with which it was paired (e.g., a girl kissing a boy). In this sense, 
the participants were aware of a form-meaning relationship at the 
moment of encoding. What they were not aware of was the specifi c 
relationship between the article and the thematic role of that entity 
being implicit within their understanding of the event. It is assumed 
that this specifi c relationship was learned implicitly through uncon-
scious abstraction processes operating over representations of multiple 
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training events in memory. This could be regarded as a form of cross-
situational statistical learning of the kind that has been found to guide 
acquisition of the meanings of content words in adults and infants 
(Smith & Yu,  2008 ). When the relationship between a form and a complex 
event is ambiguous, it can be inferred by making comparisons across 
different events, even when the events are separated in time. In a sense, 
although awareness of the relevant forms and events is clearly necessary 
for encoding them in memory, subsequent abstraction processes may 
lead to generalizations of which the learner is not aware. 
 It is important to note that this study has only shown that implicit 
learning infl uences a receptive task—and for that matter, a task that is 
identical to that in which learning occurred. It remains an open ques-
tion whether transfer to different tasks, and, in particular, spontaneous 
production tasks, requires awareness of the relevant form-meaning 
mappings. Nevertheless, the learning process that has been isolated in 
this study is of very wide generality. It can pick up correlations with 
meaning features that are implicit in lexical representations of word 
meaning (e.g., animacy) or implicit in representations of events (e.g., 
thematic role). It could thus underlie naturalistic acquisition of gram-
matical form-meaning connections in the domains of, for example, defi -
niteness or tense and aspectual distinctions. It could also provide a 
mechanism for fi ne-tuning meanings of open-class words over succes-
sive instances of use. However, this mechanism is not necessarily so 
general that it is entirely unconstrained. Just as Quine’s ( 1960 )  gavagai 
problem of indeterminate reference calls for meaning induction to be 
constrained by heuristic strategies, so too the search space for gram-
matical form-meaning connections may need to be delimited by prior 
assumptions about potentially encodable distinctions (Bickerton,  1999 , 
 2001 ). In the case of SLA, the L1 may bias selection of forms for encoding 
in memory through mechanisms of learned attention (N. C. Ellis,  2006 ) 
or may provide the inventory of meaning features that are available for 
association with those forms. Therefore, even though it is claimed here 
that implicit learning of form-meaning connections has wide generality, 
the degree to which it is constrained awaits future investigation. 
 (Received 4 February 2010) 
 NOTES 
 1.  In Williams ( 2005 , Experiment 1), the seven participants who knew no gender lan-
guages were only 54% correct on generalization items (not signifi cantly different from 
chance). Nevertheless, their performance on trained items was 74%, which was signifi -
cantly different from chance ( p < .001). 
 2.  Note that our use of the term  aware refers specifi cally to being aware of the rele-
vance of thematic role. Including participants who are aware of other, irrelevant, factors, 
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such as gender in the  unaware group is actually a conservative strategy because it could 
reduce sensitivity to effects of thematic role. 
 3.  An ANOVA was run with List as a between-participants factor. Because there was 
no main effect of list,  F (1, 18) = 1.01,  p = .33, and more importantly, absolutely no evidence 
of an interaction between list and violation effect,  F (1, 18) = 0.02,  p = .88, this factor was 
removed from further analyses. 
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